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Abstract. In software engineering contexts software may be compared
for similarity in order to detect duplicate code that indicates poor design,
and to reconstruct evolution history. Malicious software, being nothing
other than a particular type of software, can also be compared for simi-
larity in order to detect commonalities and evolution history. This paper
provides a brief introduction to the issue of measuring similarity between
malicious programs, and how evolution is known to occur in the area.
It then uses this review to try to draw lines that connect research in
software engineering (e.g., on “clone detection” ) to problems in anti-
malware research.
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1 Introduction
The problem of comparing software in order to determine how similar it is crops
up in many contexts. Sometimes a software system is compared against itself
to search for redundancies that might exist. For example, the problem of find-
ing “scavenged” pieces of code—code that has been copied and then perhaps
modified—is called “clone detection” [1]. At a more fine-grained level, programs
may be compared against themselves to reduce the size of a program by squeez-
ing out some of its redundancies at the machine-code level [2,3]. One piece of
software may also be compared against another to look for evidence of copyright
infringement or plagiarism (e.g., Lancaster et. al [4]). A software system may
also be compared to previous versions of itself in an effort to reconstruct its
evolution history (e.g., Zhou et. al [5]).
The problem of finding similarities in software systems, therefore, is a meeting
point that relates several research and practice areas, among them: software
engineering, education, and law. The aim of this paper is to show that another
area deserves to be added to that list: the area of malware analysis. The term
“malware” is used to refer to software that is malicious: worms, viruses, Trojans,
and so on. “Malware analysis” therefore refers to the problems of understanding
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and managing malicious software, a task that is ordinarily performed in the
context of computer security and defense.
But how is malware analysis related to these other areas? First, a brief in-
troduction of certain problems in malware analysis is provided in Section 2. The
overview makes the case that—like is the case for clone detection, compression,
and plagiarism—program similarity is a key sub-problem in malware analysis.
Section 3, establishes relationships to problems and research between malware
analysis and other related problems such as plagiarism and evolution analysis.
The paper concludes by arguing new research in the area is required.
2 The Reuse / Recognition War in Malware Analysis
The problem of finding similarities in programs is a central problem in malware
analysis. A key battle between malware producer and defender is reviewed below,
which is then used to explain why program similarity comparison is an important
part of the defense in this battle.
2.1 WMDs in the Signature–Variation Battle
Malware writing is now a “professional” occupation [6]. There are many illegal
money-making schemes that have been brought into the 21st century with the
aid of malware. These include identity theft (enabling fraud), theft of valuables
(such as passwords, program keys), extortion, and leasing of botnets (legions
of remotely-controlled “zombie” computers). Malware also is a great enabler of
espionage, both corporate and military. Its development has proceeded to the
point where malware construction appears now like a prodigious “industry.”
How prodigious? According to Symantec, 21,858 unique samples of malicious
programs were discovered by it in 2005 [6]. That works out to 60 per day on av-
erage. More recently, Microsoft reported that they found 97,924 distinct variants
of malware within the first half of 2006 [7]. That is over 22 per hour. If each
of these malicious programs is considered to be a delivered computer product,
then certainly the malware area can be considered to be quite the “productive”
software construction industry.
How can malware authors be so productive? There are, most assuredly, not
100,000 malware authors, each one producing a single new program once every
6 months or so. Neither are there a smaller number of authors who produce
completely new programs every few hours. Rather, most of the different malicious
programs seen are modifications of some previous one. Many of these differences
are minor: new data in an unused part of the executable headers, a change
to a string, bug fixes, and so on. Other variations signal a relatively important
change, such as the insertion of a new feature, like a new method for propagating.
These more comprehensive changes are relatively rarer; a large enough change
can trigger a change in the names given to the malware family: from “Bagle.AG”
to “Bagle.AH”, for example.
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Why are there so many variations? One of the key reasons is that malware
authors are engaged with an ongoing war against malware detector producers.
The authors do not wish to write new code from scratch, but anti-malware
companies create “signatures” to match their programs, reducing the number
of hosts that are vulnerable to its attack. In order to defeat the signatures the
malware authors can modify their programs until the most recent signatures no
longer correctly match, and the malware is not detected. Over the years, the anti-
malware companies have reduced the time needed to produce new signatures.
But, as the time needed for new signatures decreases, one might reasonably
expect the rate of variation production to increase proportionately [8]. In the
war between malware author and malware detectors, one of the major battles is
between signature and variation construction.
In this ongoing battle, malware authors need to make changes that work
to undermine recognition and hence detection. Malware authors are known to
vet their code against malware detectors. They keep versions of many malware
detectors and check to see whether (and which) signatures catch their newest ver-
sions. If their new versions are being caught, they can attempt to make changes
until they find that the signatures no longer match. That is, their battle position
is to try to make changes that destroy the ability of detectors to match them
to knowledge about previously released versions. These program modifications,
therefore, may be termed “Weapons of Match Destruction” (WMDs). A few of
these are reviewed below.
WMD: Encryption and Packing
Many malware executables are either encrypted or “packed.” In this context, it
means that the programs are no longer in a format that is directly executable
by the machine.1 Rather, what happens when a packed or encrypted program
is run is that a small decompression or decryption procedure is executed which
reconstructs the full version of the original program from the packed or encrypted
data. In either the packing or encryption case, if it is done well the result will be
indistinguishable from random data. If so, then there is effectively no possibility
of finding matches to previous versions without first unpacking or decrypting.
WMD: Byte- or Container-Level Changes
All machine-executable programs are packaged into some type of executable con-
tainer format. This container typically contains a variety of information in the
“header,” including the program’s identity, dynamic linking information, and a
list of program parts or “segments”, such as the segments holding the data and
code. By treating a program at the level of a package or string of bytes, multiple
variations can be forced on the program executables without making changes to
the actual code. These changes include: modifications of strings or values in the
data segment and change in headers.
1 The term “packed” in malware is generally distinct from the notion of “program com-
pression” in the sense frequently implied in the program compression literature [3].
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WMD: Ordinary Evolution
Like any other used software product, malware evolves. Malware evolves for
the same reasons that ordinary software evolves. A given malware family can
change over time simply because bugs are fixed. It can also evolve in response
to changing requirements. For example, changes to system defenses may require
a worm be changed to use a different exploit during propagation.
Malware also evolves by borrowing or copying code between families. In part
this is due to the voluntary sharing of ideas and code within the malware produc-
tion community. In the past, this was done using a variety of means, including
bulletin boards, magazines, and Internet-relay chat. Recently, the code to even
“professional” malware has become widely circulated; some is even published as
open source. [9] For example, one Bagle variant included its own source code.
Because of this practice, it is common for one malware family to be related to
another family via the sharing of some code.
WMD: Obfuscation
The goal of program obfuscation is to make a program more difficult to un-
derstand or analyze. In the context of malware, obfuscations can be separated
into two categories: extraction hindrance and provenance hiding. Extraction hin-
drance seeks to defeat the ability to extract accurate information about the pro-
gram. For example, it is possible to insert “junk” bytes into a program in such
a way that certain types of program disassembly produce incorrect disassembly.
Once the disassembly is rendered incorrect, follow-on detection methods may
be defeated. Provenance hiding seeks to obscure the fact that the program is
derived from a previous one. So even if program information can be extracted
correctly, the relationship to previous programs can still be obscured. For exam-
ple, if code blocks are permuted there is no effective change to the program, yet
any detection method that depends on the sequencing of blocks may be defeated.
WMD: Metamorphism
A program is called “metamorphic” if it is able to generate offspring that are
different from it due to the fact that it transforms its own code [10]. Using
metamorphism it is theoretically possible to ensure the program for each variant
is somehow different. For example, it has been conservatively estimated that
the Win32.Evol virus could conceivably create 101,339 variations in just two
generations [11].
2.2 Countering the WMDs
The fact is that most malicious programs found in the wild are variants of some
previous one [8]. Because of this, the problem of comparing unknown files to
previously-known malicious samples becomes important. In particular, from the
viewpoint of the battle analogy, for every WMD, some defensive measure must
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be constructed so that the potency of the weapons are reduced. In the ideal
case, the defense would be able to see past any WMD in order to establish
the similarity of an unknown program to known malicious programs. If such a
powerful similarity mechanism was available then a new variant with only minor
changes would not easily slip past the defenses. This capability could turn reuse
from an advantage for the malware author into a disadvantage.
3 Malware Similarity
The defense side in the signature–variation battle needs to have methods for
countering the WMDs. This means, that some way must be found for “seeing
through” the variations introduced by the WMDs. Once variations are accounted
for the new version may be matched against old ones. In this light, the problem
is one of matching a recurring pattern with variations. This can be turned into a
problem of program matching and similarity comparison. Similarity comparisons
between programs can be useful for:
1. Detecting new variants as they are released by comparing them to known
related variants.
2. Constructing new signatures to match the variant based on a similarity anal-
ysis between it and known previous variations.
3. Determining commonalities and relationships between different malware strains.
This is important for leveraging past knowledge about threats. For example,
if one knows that a new program is related to the well-known Win32.Abogot
family, then one may have a good initial idea at the sorts of malice and
problems it creates.
Thus program similarity evaluations can and do play a key role in malware
analysis. The purpose of this section is to draw out some of the relations be-
tween malware analysis and other related works in code similarity comparison.
These relations are, naturally, drawn out by noting similarities between mal-
ware analysis and these other fields. The review seeks to highlight similarities
in: problems that need solving, method used, and commonalities in research or
research direction.
3.1 Similarity of Problems
The WMDs generate the key problems for comparing programs in malware anal-
ysis. The problems they generate have some clear similarities with the essential
problems in other areas. These include:
– Plagiarism and Copyright Infringement Detection.
Relating one malicious software family to another involves, in part, com-
paring two or more software systems to find evidence where parts of one
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software system match parts of another. The same problem is shared in de-
tecting plagiarism and copyright infringement. Any of the WMDs may be
used to help hide provenance. The WMD of obfuscation provides an example
of how the problems are similar. For instance a new variant might differ only
in the fact that the registers have been consistently renamed (e.g. swapping
eax and ebx), and the order of basic blocks in the program has been per-
muted. These sorts of provenance obfuscations are, of course, common in
plagiarism and copyright infringement when the perpetrator wishes to cover
their tracks and hide the derivation relationship.
– Software Evolution and Refactoring.
Malware evolves because the authors make fixes and improvements; they also
refactor their code and insert foreign from other malware. These evolutionary
changes present challenges to knowing how the members of a malware family
relate to one another, and how different families are related via sharing of
code. A similar problem is found in ordinary software evolution wherein
changes make it difficult to track evolution, compare versions, and relate
multiple programs. To illustrate the similarities, consider the dendogram
shown in Figure 1. It shows a tree of proposed relationships between malware
programs as generated by a clustering operation. Similar trees are found in
phylogeny work for malware [12] as well as for ordinary software projects [13].
Fig. 1. Reconstructed evolution history for malware
– Compression.
At the machine code level a program can exhibit similarities that are not
present at the source code level and, conversely, similarities present at the
source code level may not be clearly expressed at the machine code level.
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Since malware is normally encountered in machine code format, malware
similarity analysis must account for the irrelevant similarities expressed at
the machine code level as well as the relevant similarities that are hidden
at the machine code level. Machine code-level program compression research
has to contend with similar problems.
Using the above analysis, a rough map of problem commonalities is produced
in Table 1. Each row indicates the WMD that causes a particular research






Table 1. Skeletal map of relations between areas
problem or issue; each column indicates the other area that is related by problem
type.
3.2 Similarity in Methods & Research
In related problem areas, methods for clone detection, copyright infringement
detection, and plagiarism detection share some common features. The overall
methods can be modeled at a very high level as consisting of a pipeline of pro-
cessing as illustrated in Figure 2. While we model this as a simple pipeline,
Fig. 2. Abstract program comparison pipeline
in reality the steps may be interleaved and sometimes certain steps are omit-
ted. This structure provides a way of organizing a comparison of methods and
research from malware analysis and other related fields.
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Normalize
Input programs frequently contain text or features that are considered irrelevant
for the purposes of the comparisons being made. Normalization is the process of
mapping the input programs into a form in such a way that irrelevant variation
is removed and the input becomes more “normal”. A classic example is to re-
move whitespace from program texts before searching for evidence of plagiarism.
Other more extensive normalizations have been proposed, including consistent
replacement of identifiers with tokens [14], tokenizing various punctuation [15],
and normalizing the form of syntax trees [16].
Normalization can also be an important step in malware analysis. In many
respects the problem of normalization is similar for malware analysis, although
in many cases the methods from benign code comparison have not carried over.
For instance, the idea of consistent tokenization of identifiers may be useful in
matching malware since instead of identifiers one can talk about registers at
the machine code, as Baker et. al [17] for virtual machine code. Nonetheless,
we do not know of any results in malware analysis using such techniques. In-
stead, the main research on normalization of malware has tended to employ
relatively heavyweight semantics-preserving program transformations. For ex-
ample, Kruegel et. al [18] investigated the use of transformations typically found
in optimizing compilers—constant propagation, simplification, and so on—for
normalizing malware as an aid to scanners; Walenstein et. al [11] used a term
rewriting system to “undo” the transformations automatically performed by a
self-rewriting virus. The more frequent use of more heavyweight semantics-based
transformations in malware normalization may be due, perhaps, to the fact that
the changes that are used to hide similarity in malware have been more com-
plicated than those typically found in, say, student plagiarism. Alternatively,
there may be fewer simple normalizations available in machine code as com-
pared to source code. Whatever the reasons, one can expect that similar types
of normalizing transformations might be used for plagiarism or clone detection.
Comparison
Once relevant items have been normalized and extract, some type of compari-
son framework must be employed to perform the comparisons. Several of such
comparison frameworks are listed by Anderson et. al [19]. These are organized,
in part, according to the “implementation techniques” used to detect clones,
which may be interpreted as indicating also the models of comparison being
used. From this list, one can see that many of these techniques are also used in
malware analysis, including: graph matching [18] and distance metrics [20].
3.3 Similarities in Research or Research Direction
In malware analysis there are many important research problems which these
align with problems found in our target related areas of clone detection, refac-
toring, plagiarism detection, and code compression. These include the following
(related important problems are placed in parentheses):
Similarity in Malware 9
– How to deal with variations created by compiler or compiler option differ-
ences (compression)
– Removing the influence of library code linked into the program (compression)
– Tracing evolution lines (clone detection/refactoring)
– Matching against large corpora (clone detection/refactoring, plagiarism)
– Removing obfuscations in programs (plagiarism)
This list is certainly not complete; rather, it can be used as a starting point
for researchers from different problem worlds in their discussion of how to col-
laborate or use results from one area in a new one.
4 Conclusions
Malicious programs evolve, and there is much borrowing of code between differ-
ent families of malware. Recognizing and modeling how these programs evolve
and are related is an important problem in the area of malware analysis. For
this reason the problem of matching and relating programs by their common
parts is a key problem within malware analysis. Since this problem shares many
parallels in other fields, many useful links to other research areas can be made.
In drawing out some of these linkages, this paper seeks to improve the amount
of cross-fertilization between research areas. In particular, we note that there
are several techniques or approaches that appear to be primarily explored in
one area or another. For example, relatively few techniques from clone detection
and plagiarism have their parallels in malware analysis (however it should be
noted that this problem in malware analysis is just now starting to get any
significant attention). Conversely, the normalization approach using semantics-
based transformations have rarely been seen in other areas such as plagiarism and
clone detection. In the future we hope that finding a common set of core problems
and approaches will serve to pool research together and result in advances in all
of the related fields.
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